There were just over seven minutes left in the third quarter of the NFC championship game when the 49ers tackled Amon-Ra St. Brown to the ground following a two-yard gain.
The play had failed because he needed four yards to get a first down, which is probably not surprising considering that the wideout from the backfield was used in that situation instead of one of the team’s two productive tailbacks.
Do you recall those outrageous TV commercials from a few Super Bowls back that boldly said, “Fortune favors the bold”? When it came to money, it proved to be a scam back then, and Sunday’s football game was no exception.
Lions coach Dan Campbell gambled — and lost.
The Lions attempted two doable field goals but were defeated 34–31.
The absurd choice made by Seahawks coach Pete Carroll to pass from the one-yard line in the final seconds of the Super Bowl, despite having a player known as “Beast Mode” in his backfield, is part of the NFL’s postseason history, which spans more than 90 years.
However, Campbell’s handling of the second half against the 49ers will go down as one of the worst big-game coaching jobs in the history of this sport.
With a stunning road effort against the 49ers, Detroit advanced to its first Super Bowl, and this might have been a lovely narrative. However, if you set the last third of the book on fire, there can be no happy ending.
There’s no denying that by choosing to worship the book of analytics rather than coach this particular game as it unfolded, Campbell sacrificed the Lions the chance to travel to the Super Bowl despite having two opportunities to send his kicker for mid-range field goals.
Thanks to outstanding efforts by players like tight end Sam LaPorta, running backs David Montgomery and Jahmyr Gibbs, and tight end David Montgomery, the Lions led by 17 points at the half.
With the ball at their disposal to begin the second half, the 49ers needed nine plays to cut their deficit to just three points.
After the Lions gained possession again, St. Brown’s run took them to the San Francisco 28 on the eighth play. It was evident that the Lions were only 45 yards away from eliminating all of the 49ers’ execution and effort that went into their comeback attempt, even for the most difficult mathematicians who follow NFL football.
Seven yards were needed for the snap and placement, and 10 yards were needed to clear the end zone. With just thirty minutes left in the game, they would need to generate three points to either tie the score or seize the lead.
That foolish choice was foolish enough, and in less than four minutes of football, its foolishness was made clear. After the 49ers cut the Lions’ advantage to 24–17 after driving 72 yards in five plays, Gibbs fumbled the team’s next possession on the first play from scrimmage.
A short while later, Christian McCaffrey’s one-yard touchdown run knotted the score.
A little over five minutes into the last quarter, the lead had disappeared along with the enthusiasm. However, almost amazingly, the game was still in play when the Detroit defense forced the Niners to settle for a field goal with 9:52 remaining.
Two minutes later, Goff drove the Lions 45 yards to the San Francisco 30.
That meant the Lions still had a chance to tie it. With half of the last quarter remaining, Campbell’s squad most likely would have been tied if he had sent out kicker Michael Badgley for a 47-yarder.
Since regaining his position in mid-December, Badgley had not missed a kick. In the previous season, he was eight out of ten on kicks ranging from forty to forty-nine yards.
Even though the failed Reynolds pass was only an hour old, Campbell decided to try the same tactic on 4th-and-3. Since he was hired three years ago, his club has tried to convert fourth downs twenty percent more often than any other NFL team.
More than any other club, he had taken a risk on fourth-and-3 plays or longer, and his side made 30 percent of the conversions. Therefore, he gambled on a plan that failed more than two-thirds of the time in an attempt to get four more points.
One of the benefits of attending Point Park College, which is now Point Park University, forty years ago was the lack of a math requirement for journalism/communications students.
Man, I quit taking math as soon as my high school’s curriculum permitted. But I’m aware that Campbell’s figures don’t add up.
In an attempt to prove how bold he is, he gave up control of the game and, shortly after, he gave up a chance to recover what he had squandered.
In Super Bowl 51, Dan Quinn and the Falcons blew a 28-3 halftime lead over the Patriots with some dubious choices that let Tom Brady rally.
A few years prior, with the Seahawks needing a late touchdown to win, the Pats profited from the iconic choice made by Russell Wilson to throw a pass near the goal line rather than give the ball to Marshawn Lynch.
They’ve got to be relieved now.
Because Campbell made twice as many absurd choices on a stage almost as large
.Afterward, he remarked, “I just felt really good about us converting.” “I don’t regret the choices I made.
“The easy answer is that the Lions consistently engaged in this behavior and that their success this season may be attributed to their aggressiveness. However, a team that thrives on long passes isn’t supposed to be blowing 10-point leads late in the fourth quarter and airing out first-down go-routes.
In cases such as these, the prevailing theme is to state: This is how we’ve always done it. That is, however, an excuse rather than an explanation.
